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Does Writing Down Goodwill Imperil a CEO's Job? 
1. Introduction 
In this research, we investigate whether boards use recognized goodwill impairment 
charges as indicators of chief executive officer (CEO) underperformance in managing mergers and 
acquisition (M&A), leading to CEO turnover. Mergers and acquisitions can destroy substantial 
amounts of acquiring shareholder wealth (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). CEOs are 
critical in selecting, negotiating, and integrating M&As, but researchers have rarely studied the 
effects of M&A performance on CEO turnover. A notable exception is Lehn and Zhao (2006), 
who report that firms that suffer greater shareholder wealth losses at and following acquisition 
announcements are more likely to replace their CEOs within five years. More than half of the CEO 
turnovers cannot be explained by the acquirer going bankrupt or being taken over. Lehn and Zhao 
argue that their results provide evidence that internal governance punishes managers who make 
acquisitions that destroy value.  
Lehn and Zhao (2006) emphasize the stock-price reaction to an M&A announcement as 
the key indicator of the value created or destroyed by the deal. However, other studies argue that 
acquirer announcement stock-price reactions can be incomplete due to distortions from arbitrage 
trading (Mitchell, Pulvino and Stafford, 2004), limited investor attention (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 
2003; Oler, 2008), or the acquirer’s unanticipated difficulty in subsequently integrating the target 
(Hoberg and Phillips, 2018). Few studies examine the extent to which CEO replacements are a 
function of ex post information about M&A performance. Neither long-run stock-price 
performance nor overall accounting performance measures can clearly isolate the M&A effect 
from other influences on firm performance over the years following the transaction (Renneboog 
and Vansteenkiste, 2019). 
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A related issue is when and how the board learns that a CEO’s M&A-related performance 
is unacceptable. Jenter and Lewellen (2017) report evidence that boards are slow to learn about 
CEO performance; the sensitivity of the board’s beliefs to new performance signals declines 
slowly, suggesting that boards are unable to figure out CEO ability even after observing 
performance for many years. The authors remark that “negative signals need to accumulate before 
a CEO is replaced”. The findings imply that early indications of the CEO’s M&A-related 
performance including the stock-price reaction to the deal announcement, and early post-
announcement stock and operating performance, do not trigger a CEO replacement by themselves. 
Historically, publicly observable M&A-specific performance indicators were not regularly 
available. However, an overhaul of merger accounting standards in 2001 mandated that firms 
regularly evaluate merger goodwill for impairment and write down its value when the fair value 
of goodwill declines because there is a deterioration in the capabilities of the acquired net assets 
to generate expected future cash flows. The resulting impairment charges appear on the income 
statement, providing an observable indicator of the degree to which an M&A transaction has failed 
to create the value originally expected. 
Several studies give us reason to expect that boards do not rely solely on stock price-based 
indicators, such as those investigated by Lehn and Zhao (2006), of poor CEO performance in 
making turnover decisions. Bond, Goldstein and Prescott (2009) develop a rational expectations 
model in which security prices reflect information about both firm fundamentals and expectations 
of corrective actions by agents. They show that nonmarket sources of information are important 
complements to security prices for agents (such as boards) to use in deciding on an intervention 
(such as replacing a CEO). Arya, Mittendorf, and Ramanan (2017) also provide theoretical support 
for the idea that accounting reports help decision makers understand the implications of 
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information embedded in stock prices. Several empirical studies find that accounting-based 
measures of firm performance are associated with CEO turnover while controlling for stock-price 
performance (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Engle, Hayes, and Wang, 
2003; Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Ghosh and Wang, 2019). 
The measurement of a goodwill impairment is based on firm expectations about future 
performance and cash flows; an impairment implies that the firm no longer expects future cash 
flows to meet prior expectations. Research indicates that goodwill impairment is informative to 
board compensation committees and market participants . For example, impairment charge 
announcements are associated with negative stock returns (Bens, Heltzer and Segal, 2011; Chen, 
Kohlbeck and Warfield, 2008; Li et al., 2011) and often followed by downward revisions of analyst 
forecasts (Li et al., 2011). Gu and Lev (2011) argue that goodwill impairment charges are related 
to overpriced acquirer equity at the time of the transaction. Darrough, Guler, and Wang (2014) 
find that goodwill impairment losses are negatively associated with cash- and option-based CEO 
compensation. The compensation contract sets up an incentive mechanism determined by the 
association between pay and performance. However, boards’ turnover decisions likely reflect a 
broader set of concerns than compensation decisions (Engel, Hayes and Wang, 2003). CEO 
turnover can also be driven by the board’s conclusion that the CEO’s ability is low, or the CEO’s 
skills are not well matched to the firm’s need. 
The process for testing goodwill for impairment is both technically challenging and subject 
to misaligned incentives (Ayres et al., 2019b). Management would likely prefer to avoid 
recognition of an impairment charge, while auditors should be skeptical and seek to minimize 
biases in impairment testing. The misaligned incentives can create tension in the audit process, 
which, particularly when faced with a proposed write-down that is material, is likely to involve 
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the audit committee of the board (McCracken, Salterio, and Gibbins, 2008). Therefore, an 
impairment charge is likely to become salient to the board before the financial statements are 
released publicly, with the impairment recognition decision potentially being finalized during the 
audit period. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests a link between the recognition of goodwill impairment and 
management turnover. For example, AOL’s acquisition of Time Warner in 2001 resulted in a $54 
billion goodwill write-down in 2002; in January 2003 CEO Stephen Case resigned his position as 
chairperson. Similarly, Avon recognized a goodwill write-down of $263 million in the fourth 
quarter of 2011. The previous quarter, Avon had announced that Andrea Jung, who had held the 
roles of both CEO and chairperson of the board since 1999, would no longer serve as CEO. 
However, prior research has not investigated whether goodwill impairment charges affect the 
probability of terminating a CEO responsible for an acquisition decision preceding the impairment. 
We examine 5,990 firm-years of CEO retention decisions from 2002–2016. Each firm 
executed at least one M&A transaction between 1997 and 2016. Among the CEOs who led the 
firms at the time of the transactions, 473 experienced a forced turnover, and 207 departed due to 
death, personal health, or retirement, which we identify as voluntary turnover. Logistic regression 
results show that the recognition and magnitude of goodwill impairment in the two fiscal years 
prior to the focal year are positively associated with forced CEO turnover, but not with voluntary 
turnover. Additional tests ease any concern that the goodwill impairment charges could represent 
a “big bath” taken by new CEOs. 
When we control for market reactions around prior acquisition announcements, the 
association between goodwill impairment and forced CEO turnovers is still significant. This result 
supports the hypothesis that boards perceive goodwill impairment charges as new information 
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about CEO performance, reflecting a failure to realize the value expected from the acquisition. We 
partition goodwill impairment charges into expected and unexpected components, and find that 
only the unexpected component of goodwill impairment is informative and associated with forced 
CEO turnover. When we examine how audit quality affects the goodwill impairment and CEO 
turnovers, we find the positive association between the goodwill impairment and CEO turnover is 
only significant for companies that are audited by Big 4 (Big 5) auditors, suggesting accounting 
quality plays a role in boards’ decisions. 
This paper contributes to both the CEO turnover literature and the asset write-off literature, 
as well as providing new evidence to standard setters. The literature on CEO turnovers consistently 
reports a negative association between CEO turnover and stock returns, broad accounting 
performance, or both (e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; 
Mikkelson and Partch, 1997). However, these performance measures can be influenced by many 
factors including some that are not controllable by CEOs (Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Jenter and 
Kanaan, 2015). Theoretical literature on CEO dismissal decisions suggests that corporate boards 
learn from other indicators of CEO quality (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1994, 1998; Warther, 1998). 
Our finding that the need to recognize a goodwill impairment conveys new information to the 
board about the quality of CEOs adds to the evidence on the use of such other indicators. 
Second, our paper adds to the asset write-off literature. Prior literature finds that asset 
write-offs and write-downs are value relevant and negatively associated with stock returns (Francis, 
Hanna and Vincent, 1996; Alciator, Easton and Spear, 2000; Chen, Kohlbeck and Warfield, 2008; 
Li et al., 2011). However, the informativeness of reported goodwill balances and impairment 
charges is controversial. Li and Sloan (2017) find that goodwill impairment charges are less 
informative in the post-SFAS 142 period and posit that impairments have become less timely and 
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more predictable. Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) and Riedl (2004) report that CEO turnover 
precedes goodwill impairment. They find new CEOs are likely to “take a big bath,” that is, record 
higher asset impairment charges that investors and boards could attribute to the former CEO’s 
performance. We provide new insight on this issue by documenting a positive association between 
goodwill impairment and CEO turnovers. We also show that goodwill impairment charges are 
greater before forced versus voluntary CEO departures.  
Third, our study responds to the FASB’s current project on the costs and benefits of current 
goodwill impairment rules. The FASB’s stated goal is to improve the decision usefulness of 
goodwill reporting (FASB, 2019b). The FASB may eliminate impairment testing on an annual 
basis (FASB, 2019a) and reintroduce a less costly procedure, goodwill amortization, because 
“some users explained that impairments do not provide meaningful information” (FASB, 2019a, 
page 7) Our findings imply that boards use goodwill impairment charges to evaluate CEO 
performance and make CEO retention decisions. In contrast, the annual goodwill amortization 
can’t alert boards about the underperformance of merger and acquisition transactions. 
2. Goodwill Accounting Background 
Before 2001, goodwill was required to be amortized over its useful life, not to exceed 40 
years. In 2001, the FASB issued SFAS 142, which introduced the present accounting model for 
goodwill. At the date of an acquisition, goodwill is an asset generally measured as the excess of 
the fair value of the consideration paid over the fair value of net identifiable assets (ASC 805-30-
30-01). Subsequently, firms are required to use a two-step process to recalculate the implied fair 
value of goodwill annually and record, if necessary, a charge against earnings for any reduction in 
value (ASC 350-30-35-11). In 2017, to reduce the preparation cost by simplifying the goodwill 
impairment test, the FASB issued ASU No. 2017-04, whichremoved step two of the goodwill 
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impairment test (FASB, 2017). Step two involves estimating the implied fair value of goodwill, 
which requires allocating the estimated fair value of a reporting unit to individual assets and 
liabilities within the reporting unit. The ASU requires only step one of the goodwill impairment 
test, which compares the fair value of a reporting unit with its carrying value, including goodwill. 
In October of 2019, in response to stakeholder concerns about the cost to perform the goodwill 
impairment test, the FASB announced that it is revisiting the subsequent accounting for goodwill 
and invited comments from stakeholders on the costs and benefits of current goodwill accounting. 
Theoretically, the fair market value of goodwill should reflect the present value of 
projected cash flow increases of a business entity expected to result from the acquisition. In 
practice, goodwill could come from acquired intangible assets that do not have a specifically 
identified value, overvaluation of the consideration paid by the acquirer, over (or under) payment 
by the acquirer, or any combination thereof. Errors in valuing the acquisition can make realizing 
the expected value of the acquisition less likely (Johnson and Petrone, 1998). After the acquisition, 
to the extent that the present value of expected future cash flows from the acquired assets falls 
short of original projections, goodwill is impaired. An impairment could result from unanticipated 
changes in the industry or economy, or from suboptimal management decisions at the time of the 
acquisition or later. 
3. Related Literature 
Research evidence indicates that goodwill accounting under the impairment model is 
informative to market participants. Impairment charge announcements are associated with 
negative stock-price reactions (Bens, Heltzer and Segal, 2011; Chen, Kohlbeck and Warfield, 2008; 
Li et al., 2011) and often followed by downward revisions of analyst forecasts (Li et al., 2011). 
Lee (2011) reports that goodwill has become more useful in predicting future cash flows under the 
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impairment model than under the previous requirement that goodwill be amortized and expensed 
over a 40-year life. Sun (2016), using a measure of managerial ability from Demerjian, Lev and 
McVay (2012), finds that higher-ability managers are less likely to have goodwill impairment 
losses. Higher-ability managers also incur smaller losses when they do have impaired goodwill. 
Some authors suggest that the impairment model of accounting for goodwill offers firms 
excessive discretion, creating a risk that firms could manipulate the timing of charges in response 
to ulterior incentives at the expense of providing up-to-date information to investors. When the 
accounting change that required impairment testing rather than amortization went into effect, firms 
could make a one-time choice to write off goodwill “below the line” without affecting income 
from current operations. Beatty and Weber (2006) find that firms facing this one-time choice were 
influenced by expected effects on stock-price reactions, managerial bonus plans, and debt 
covenants. Shalev, Zhang and Zhang (2013) find that at the time of an acquisition, managers with 
compensation packages that rely heavily on accounting earnings-based bonuses over-allocate the 
acquisition price to goodwill. Ramanna and Watts (2012) report empirical support for their 
argument that the opacity of the testing process introduced by SFAS 142 lets managers delay 
recognizing impairment. Similarly, Li and Sloan (2017) present evidence consistent with 
overstated goodwill and delayed goodwill impairments under the SFAS 142 procedures. The 
authors find that stock prices do not fully impound the negative information in future, delayed 
goodwill impairments, implying that managers can temporarily create overvalued shares by 
postponing charges. Some financial statement users suggest that goodwill testing and related 
impairments are confirmative, rather than predictive (KPMG, 2014). 
Lehn and Zhao (2006) examine a sample of firms that made acquisitions from 1990 through 
1998. They use market reactions and subsequent stock-price performance to identify value-
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destroying acquisition decisions, which implicitly lead to future CEO firings. Specifically, they 
find that firms with more negative stock-price reactions to acquisition announcements are more 
likely to experience CEO turnovers in the subsequent five years. Lehn and Zhao argue that their 
results provide evidence that internal governance punishes managers who make acquisitions that 
destroy value. Our paper differs from theirs in that we investigate whether goodwill impairment 
charges, determined under procedures instituted after the end of their sample period, provide 
additional acquisition-specific information that boards use in deciding to replace CEOs. 
Gu and Lev (2011) report an association between the use of overvalued stock to pay for 
imprudent acquisitions and subsequent goodwill impairment charges. The authors find that post-
acquisition, pre-impairment-announcement stock returns have predictive power for impairment 
charges. Even so, we argue that the stock price before the recognition of impairment may not fully 
capture the economic loss revealed by the write-off. Alternatively, a goodwill impairment charge 
could embody information previously available but be a more salient or more interpretable 
performance indicator for board action because of its acquisition-specific nature and the 
requirement that the goodwill asset be evaluated for impairment at least annually. As Gu and Lev 
(2011) observe, a goodwill impairment charge is “an important business event signaling a flawed 
investment strategy.” 
Agency theory predicts that firms’ corporate governance mechanisms discipline managers 
and direct them to focus on creating value (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Numerous studies report that 
CEO dismissals are sensitive to firm stock-price performance (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Huson, 
Parino and Starks, 2001; Bushman, Dai and Wang, 2010; Kaplan and Minton, 2012), accounting 
measures of performance (e.g., Farrell and Whidbee, 2003; Huson, Malatesta and Parrino, 2004), 
or both (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Engle, Hayes and Wang, 2003; 
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Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Ghosh and Wang, 2019). No research to date examines whether boards 
use goodwill impairment information in managerial retention decisions.1 Darrough, Guler and 
Wang (2014) study the compensation committee’s response to goodwill impairment losses and 
find negative associations between goodwill impairment and both cash and option-based 
compensation. Whereas they analyze the compensation of CEOs who remain, we examine the 
more momentous decision faced by the board of whether to replace the CEO. Our paper also differs 
from theirs in that our empirical design is based on tracking the mergers and acquisitions during a 
CEO’s tenure, allowing us to control for the number and pricing of acquisitions under that 
individual’s leadership. 
4. Hypothesis Development 
Initiating mergers and acquisitions and overseeing their progress are considered CEOs’ 
major responsibilities. CEOs are critical in selecting, negotiating, and integrating M&As, and 
failed M&As can destroy substantial amounts of acquiring shareholder wealth (Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). Impairment charges imply a deterioration in the ability of the 
acquisition to generate expected future cash flows and indicate an M&A that failed to meet 
performance expectations. Because of their leadership role in M&A decisions, CEOs are likely to 
be held responsible for the value loss. To the extent that the determination of the existence and 
materiality of the impairment charge contains new information about the CEOs M&A 
underperformance, we expect that it conveys new information about the CEO’s M&A performance 
to the board. First, the goodwill impairment charge presents the board with additional information 
                                                 
1 Masters-Stout, Costigan and Lovata (2008) and Glaum, Landsman and Wyrwa (2018) report that a goodwill 
impairment is more likely in the first year of a CEO’s tenure. Beatty and Weber (2006) find that a goodwill impairment 
is more likely the shorter the time the CEO has been in the position. Unlike our paper, none of these studies investigates 
the relation between a goodwill impairment charge and a subsequent change in CEO. 
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about any overpayment at the acquisition date, subsequent failure to realize expected cash flows 
by integrating the target, or both. Both the initial overpayment for an acquisition and the 
subsequent failure to realize expected synergies are directly related to the CEO’s ability and 
judgments. Second, goodwill impairment charges lead to negative stock-price reactions (Bens, 
Heltzer and Segal, 2011; Chen, Kohlbeck and Warfield, 2008; Li et al., 2011) and downward 
revisions of analyst forecasts (Li et al., 2011), which bring extra pressure on the board to reassess 
the CEO’s performance and review its CEO retention decision. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Goodwill impairment following M&A deals selected and managed by a 
CEO is positively associated with the probability of a forced replacement of the CEO. 
As several authors point out, there is substantial discretion in the measurement and timing 
of recognizing goodwill impairment (Beatty and Weber, 2006; Ramanna and Watts, 2012; Li and 
Sloan, 2017). Management has insider knowledge about the need for and the magnitude of possible 
impairment charges. However, the board and market participants such as analysts also use 
available information to make independent predictions of the market value of the entity, and 
declines in their expectations of market value may signal possible goodwill impairments (Ayres et 
al., 2019a). The eventual recognition of goodwill impairment potentially could be anticipated by 
market participants, such that the market reaction to impairment could be fully impounded in the 
stock price. If so, the recognition of an impairment charge on the income statement would provide 
no new information. However, if the goodwill impairment is taken unexpectedly or at an amount 
that is larger than the market expectation, the disclosure of the impairment loss conveys new 
information to the market and the board. Therefore, any unexpected component of a goodwill 
impairment charge is more likely to be associated with forced CEO turnover than the expected 
portion. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
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HYPOTHESIS 2. Unexpected goodwill impairment following M&A deals selected and 
managed by a CEO is more positively associated with the probability of a forced 
replacement of the CEO than an expected goodwill impairment. 
Previous literature provides evidence of the impact of market intermediaries on financial 
reporting quality. Higher perceived audit quality, which is associated with a Big 4 audit, is also 
associated with higher financial reporting quality, as indicated by lower discretionary accruals, a 
higher earnings response coefficient, and a lower cost of equity capital (e.g. Becker et al., 1998; 
Krishnan, 2003; Khurana and Raman, 2004). Analysts also perform a monitoring role with respect 
to financial reporting quality, as shown by prior studies on their effects on discretionary accruals 
(Yu, 2008; Chen et al., 2015), accounting conservatism (Sun and Liu, 2011), and real earnings 
management (Duellman, Ahmed, and Abdel-Meguid, 2013). Ayres et al. (2019a) find that analyst 
coverage affects goodwill impairment decisions. We expect that the goodwill impairment 
recognized by companies with higher audit quality and who have a greater number of analysts 
following them are more reliable and informative. Boards are expected to have a stronger reaction 
to these impairment disclosures. Our third set of hypotheses is: 
HYPOTHESIS 3a. Goodwill impairment following M&A deals selected and managed by a 
CEO is more positively associated with the probability of a forced replacement of the CEO 
for companies audited by Big 4(5) auditors than for companies audited by non-Big 4(5) 
auditors. 
HYPOTHESIS 3b. Goodwill impairment following M&A deals selected and managed by a 
CEO is more positively associated with the probability of a forced replacement of the CEO 
for companies followed by more analysts than for companies followed by fewer analysts. 
5. Sample and Research Model 
Sample 
To form our sample of CEOs who completed at least one acquisitions during their tenure, 
we first search for mergers and acquisitions in Thomson One Banker completed from 1997 to 
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2016.2 Our tests use firm-years starting in 2002, since SFAS 142 took effect on June 30, 20013. 
We require the acquirer to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), Nasdaq, or 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX), with a market value of at least $100 million four weeks before 
the transaction. We exclude acquirers in the financial and utility sectors and consider only deals 
with value at least 10 percent of the acquirer’s prior market value, leaving 4,973 merger and 
acquisition events from 2,343 unique acquirers. We identify the CEO at the time of acquisition 
using Compustat Execucomp. We obtain financial statement data from Compustat, stock market 
data from CRSP, and analyst following from I/B/E/S. We track the acquirer until the CEO departs, 
the firm is delisted, or the end of 2016, whichever is later. We delete firm-years with prior zero 
goodwill because a goodwill impairment charge is impossible. Our final sample includes 5,990 
firm-year observations. Table 1 presents details of the sample selection procedure Table 1. 
Empirical Model 
To test the association between goodwill impairments and forced CEO turnover, we 
estimate the following logistic regression: 
Prob (FORCEDt) = b0 + b1GWIPt-1 [GWIPDUMt-1] + b2LNATt-1 + b3GWt-1 + b4BHARt-1 + 
b5ROAt-1 + b6LEVt-1 + b7BTMt-1 + b8LNAGEt-1 + b9LNTENUREt-1 + b10CHAIRt-1 
+ b11FOUNDERt-1 + b12SHROWNt-1 + b13BIGAUDt-1 + b14LNANALYSTt-1 + 
Industry fixed effect + Year fixed effect.                                                              (1) 
The dependent variable is FORCED, an indicator variable equal to one when the CEO is 
forced to step down and zero in all other cases (CEO continuations and voluntary departures). To 
identify forced CEO departures, we use the approach of Parrino (1997), as do most studies of 
managerial turnover in the past two decades (e.g., Farrell and Whidbee, 2003; Berry et al., 2006; 
Lehn and Zhao, 2006; Guo and Masulis, 2015; Kang, 2018). We search for information about each 
                                                 
2 Thomson One Banker is another interface to the same data as the widely cited SDC Platinum. 
3 We require acquisition data from 1997 to include acquisitions identified 5 years prior to the first sample year (2002).  
 14 
CEO departure in SEC 8-K fillings and the Lexis-Nexis news database. If there is no related 8-K 
filing or news story, we examine the CEO information in the firm’s proxy statements and 10-K 
filings. The departure of a CEO is classified as forced if we find no report that the turnover is due 
to death, poor health, the acceptance of another position, or retirement, and the CEO is younger 
than 65.4 
Our variable of interest measures the goodwill impairment charges in the two years 
preceding the year of a potential CEO turnover. GWIP is the annual goodwill impairment charge 
(as a nonnegative number) scaled by the book value of total assets at the beginning of the year, 
summed over the two fiscal years preceding the fiscal year in which we measure FORCED. 
GWIPDUM is equal to one if there is a goodwill impairment charge in the two-year period, and 
zero otherwise. The potential to impair goodwill depends on the amount of goodwill on the balance 
sheet at the beginning of the year, GW, which is included in the regressions. 
We control for firm characteristics that are known to be correlated with CEO turnover, 
including firm size, performance, growth opportunities, risk (financial stress), CEO characteristics, 
and the firm’s information environment. Firm size is represented by the log of total assets (LNAT) 
at the beginning of the year. The firm performance measures are BHAR, the market-adjusted buy-
and-hold abnormal return during the preceding fiscal-year, and return on assets (ROA), measured 
as income before goodwill impairment and extraordinary items and scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the year. 
The book-to-market equity ratio (BTM) and the leverage ratio (total liabilities divided by 
total assets, LEV) are our growth opportunity and risk measures, respectively. CEO characteristics 
include LNAGE, the log of the CEO’s age; CHAIR, equal to one if the CEO is the chairman of the 
                                                 
4 To reduce the risk of misclassification, we also try including as forced departures those where retirement is the stated 
reason and the CEO is younger than 60. This reclassification does not affect our conclusion. 
 15 
board; FOUNDER, equal to one if the CEO is the founder of the firm; LNTENURE, the log of the 
number of years that the CEO has held the position; and SHROWN, the number of shares held by 
the CEO as the percentage of total shares outstanding. The information environment variables are 
based on auditor quality and analyst coverage. BIGAUD equals one if a firm’s auditor is one of the 
Big 4 (Big 5 before Arthur Andersen LLP’s collapse), and zero otherwise. LNANALYST is equal 
to the log of the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for the firm. In addition, industry 




Panel A of Table 1 reports summary statistics for the full sample. It shows that 7.9 percent 
of sample firm-years include a forced CEO turnover. The average two-year-period goodwill 
impairment charge is 1.5 percent of firm assets, with about one in five firm-periods including at 
least one nonzero goodwill impairment charge. The average total assets (untabulated) is $2.307 
billion and the average log total assets is about $7.7 million. Starting goodwill is, on average, 20 
percent of total assets. The average buy-and-hold one-year average abnormal return is 6.3 percent 
and the average ROA is 4.5 percent. The mean CEO age and tenure are 56 and seven years, 
respectively. More than half of CEOs also hold the position of board chair; 5 percent of CEOs 
founded the firm. Big 4 (5) auditors audit 69 percent of the companies, and the mean number of 
analysts covering the firm (untabulated) is seven, with the mean of log analysts being 1.9. 
                                                 
5 Industry groupings are based on SIC codes: Agricultural, mining & construction = 0–1999; Manufacturing = 2000–
3999 (excluding SIC codes counted in Technology); Technology = 3570–3579 and 7370–7379; Transportation = 
4000–4799; Communications = 4800–4899; Utilities = 4900–4999; Wholesale and Retail = 5000–5999; Services = 
7000–8999 (excluding SIC codes counted in Technology). 
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Panel B of Table 1 compares firm-years with and without a forced CEO turnover. Forced 
CEO changes are preceded by larger and more frequent goodwill impairment charges than firm-
years without CEO changes or with voluntary changes, with a mean of 2.3 percent versus 1.4 
percent of total assets and frequency of 27.9 percent versus 19.7 percent. Firms with forced 
turnovers are larger and have more goodwill relative to total assets. Stock-price performance is 
significantly worse in the forced-turnover subsample, with a mean BHAR of –4.8 percent versus 
+7.2 percent. Similarly, ROA averages 3.5 percent preceding forced turnover firm-years versus 4.6 
percent otherwise. Leverage and book-to-market ratios do not differ significantly between the 
subsamples. CEOs forced out are slightly older than those remaining in place or leaving voluntarily, 
with mean log values corresponding to 58 versus 56 years old. CEOs forced out have been in place 
for a mean 7.9 years, compared with 7.2 years for CEOs in other firm-years. There is no difference 
between subsamples for firms based on whether the CEO chairs the board or is the founder of the 
company. The share ownership of CEOs forced out is significantly less than the ownership of non-
forced CEOs, 1.2 percent versus 2.1 percent of total shares outstanding. Auditor quality and analyst 
coverage do not differ significantly between forced turnover years and other years.. 
Table 2 presents pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables. Forced 
CEO turnover is significantly associated, at the 1% level, with the recognition and magnitude of 
goodwill impairment, larger size of assets and goodwill, worse firm performance as represented 
by a smaller buy-and-hold return or smaller ROA, greater CEO age and CEO tenure, and smaller 
CEO ownership. The largest correlations among right-hand-side variables are between LNAT and 
LEV (0.345), and between LNAGE and LNTENURE (0.339). All other pairwise correlations of 
explanatory and control variables are below 0.30 in absolute value. 
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Main Results 
Table 3 presents the main logistic regression results. Model (1), the main estimate of 
equation (1), uses the full sample of firm-years with a forced CEO turnover (FORCED = 1) or a 
voluntary turnover or no CEO change (FORCED = 0). Hypothesis 1 predicts that if the magnitude 
of goodwill impairment informs the board about CEO under performance in M&A selection and 
integration, the coefficient on GWIP will be positive and significant. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, the coefficient of GWIP in model (1) is 2.825, statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
The marginal effect of GWIP (not tabulated) is 0.197. Thus, for a one-standard-deviation increase 
of GWIP (0.053), the unconditional probability of forced turnover increases by 1.0 percent. 
Relative to the overall sample forced turnover rate of 7.9 percent, goodwill impairment has an 
economically significant association with CEO replacement. The associations between control 
variables and CEO turnover are generally consistent with prior studies (e.g., Parrino, 1997; Lehn 
and Zhao, 2006; Fee, Hadlock and Pierce, 2013). The probability of CEO turnover is higher for 
firms with larger assets and goodwill, for those with poor performance (both stock- and 
accounting-based), and for those with less analyst coverage. CEOs who are older, who hold fewer 
shares, and who do not chair the board are more likely to be fired. 
Table 3, model (2) is similar to model (1) except that the dichotomous variable GWIPDUM 
replaces GWIP to test whether the occurrence of goodwill impairment, without consideration of 
the magnitude of impairment, leads to involuntary CEO turnover. The coefficient of GWIPDUM 
is 0.467, again significant at the 1 % level, indicating that the existence of at least one goodwill 
impairment recognition in the previous two years is associated with a greater probability of forced 
CEO replacement, on average. The untabulated marginal effect of GWIPDUM is 0.9 percent, 
meaning that if GWIPDUM changes from zero to one, the unconditional probability of forced CEO 
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turnover increases by 3 percent. Given the unconditional probability of CEO turnover in our 
sample of 7.9 percent, these marginal effects are economically significant. 
The associations between control variables and the dependent variable are mostly 
consistent with expectations and prior literature (e.g., Parrino, 1997; Lehn and Zhao, 2006; Fee et 
al., 2013). The likelihood of CEO turnover is higher for firms with larger assets and goodwill, for 
those with poor performance (both stock- and accounting-based), and for those with fewer analyst 
followings. CEOs who are older, with fewer shares, and not chairing the board are likely to be 
fired. 
Firms that experience voluntary CEO departures could potentially be different from those 
with no CEO turnover, with unknown effects on the above results. Therefore, Table 3, model (3) 
reports estimates of equation (1) after dropping 207 CEO replacements that we classify as non-
forced (those that appear to be for reasons such as health, personal concerns, retirement, or M&A). 
The results are qualitatively similar to those of model (1), with the coefficient of GWIP being 2.77, 
significant at the 1% level.6 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the recognition of goodwill impairment informs the board’s 
decision to replace the CEO. This argument gives no reason to expect an association between 
goodwill impairment and voluntary CEO changes. Finding such an association would suggest 
either that goodwill impairment is not a channel by which poor M&A performance causes CEO 
dismals or that our classification method does not cleanly separate forced from voluntary turnovers. 
To investigate this possibility, Table 3, model (4) presents a falsification test in which voluntary 
turnover replaces forced turnover in equation (1) and the 473 forced turnovers from the main 
sample are dropped. The resulting coefficient of GWIP is negative and statistically insignificant. 
                                                 
6 An untabulated regression with GWIPDUM replacing GWIP in model (3) produces identical inferences to those from 
model (2). 
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Overall, results presented in Table 3 support Hypothesis 1: Goodwill impairment charges 
appear to provide useful information about the CEO’s ability and performance in making merger 
and acquisition decisions and operationalizing the post-merger activities, which in turn serves as 
an input for CEO retention decisions. 
Since Lehn and Zhao (2006) relate forced CEO turnover to the value creation implied by 
the stock-price effects of acquisition announcements, we test whether the association between 
goodwill impairment provides incremental effect on CEO turnover. To do this, we expand equation 
(1) by adding CAR, the cumulative abnormal (market-adjusted) return over the three-day window 
around the merger or acquisition announcement. If a CEO completed more than one M&A deal 
during the tenure, CAR is calculated as the average of CARs for all M&A deals that the CEO 
completed before the current fiscal year. We also include the interaction of CAR and GWIP. CAR 
represents the present value of expected future incremental cash flows to the acquirer resulting 
from the business combination, net of the price paid. The interaction term allows us to test the 
prediction that the interplay between the deal announcement effect and subsequent goodwill 
impairment is associated with the probability of forced CEO turnover. 
Table 4 reports the results. In model (1), the coefficient of GWIP continues to be positive 
and significant at the 1 % level. The coefficient of CAR is -0.035 but statistically insignificant, 
although the Chi-square value is 1.718. The interaction term is positive but is also insignificant. 
Model (2) of Table 4 replaces GWIP with GWIPDUM, which produces no change of sign or 
significance of the coefficients of CAR or the interaction term. While the sign of the CAR 
coefficient is similar to that found by Lehn and Zhao (2006), the lack of significance is not. 7 The 
                                                 
7 There are several differences in research design, as well as sample period, between our paper and Lehn and Zhao 
(2006). For CEOs who make multiple acquisitions, Lehn and Zhao only include the first acquisition completed by the 
CEO. We do not assume that a CEO’s first acquisition is the most important, and therefore we calculate the average 
CAR of announcements for all acquisitions under the CEO prior to the focal year. Lehn and Zhao report a mean 3-
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results imply that taking into account recent goodwill impairment charges, the past stock-price 
reaction to the deal announcement does not influence the board’s decision to replace the CEO 
directly or through goodwill impairment. 
To test Hypothesis 2, we calculated unexpected goodwill impairment based on the stock-
market valuation of the firm, assuming that the market efficiently impounds information available 
to the board into stock prices. The unexpected goodwill impairment represents the surprise or 
information content of the goodwill impairment recognition. Evidence that forced turnover is 
associated only with the unexpected impairment would be consistent with reported goodwill 
impairment being an informational channel between the CEO’s M&A performance and the board’s 
decision to fire or retain the CEO. 
Accounting standards require a goodwill impairment when the book value of a unit’s assets 
exceeds the present value of its expected future net cash flows. We cannot observe these quantities 
at the unit level, so following prior literature we use their firm-level values as proxies (Li et al., 
2011; Ramanda and Watts, 2012; Ayers et al., 2019a). To estimate expected goodwill impairment, 
we first subtract the firm’s market value of equity from book value of equity. We measure market 
value of equity as stock price times common shares outstanding at the end of fiscal year. We 
measure book value of equity as the pre-impairment book value of equity at the end of the fiscal 
year8. We calculate this estimate as of the end of the two years of GWIP calculation period, and 
                                                 
day CARs of -1.27% around the announcement date. Our mean of averaged three-day CARs is 1.37%, which is 
consistent with Alexandridis, Antypas and Travlos (2017), who find short-run stock returns of 1.05% around the 
merger announcement in 2009-2015, which is closer to our period than Lehn and Zhao’s 1990-1998 sample. In 
addition, we try separating negative and positive announcement reactions, given suggestions in the literature that only 
negative returns at the announcement date have predictive power for future performance. Regardless of return 
specification, we find no significant associations between any return specifications and CEO turnover and our test 
variable remain significance at 0.01 level. 
8 We use two alternative measures of book value of equity: 1) the book value of equity as the beginning period book-
value of equity following Li and Sloan (2017); and 2) pre-impairment book value equity less the ending goodwill 
balance, which focus on tangible net assets following Li et al. (2011). Results are qualitatively the same. 
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sum the two values to produce EXPGWIP. For easy interpretation, we measure unexpected 
goodwill indicator variable, UNEXPDUM, as 1 if EXPGWIP is less than or equal to zero, 0 if 
EXPGWIP is larger than zero. 
We test Hypothesis 2 in Table 5.9 The column (1) results show that the association between 
GWIP and forced CEO turnover for a subsample of firms with unexpected goodwill impairment 
(UNEXPDUM =1). The coefficient of GWIP is positive and significant at the 1% level. Column 
(2) reports results for the subsample of firms with expected goodwill impairment. The coefficient 
of GWIP is positive but not significant. Column (3) repeats the tests in columns (1) and (2) and 
replaces GWIP with GWIPDUM. The results in Table 5 indicate that only the unexpected goodwill 
impairment is associated with subsequent forced turnover. This is consistent with the board’s 
learning about CEO performance from reported goodwill impairment. Further, boards appear to 
recognize and hold CEOs accountable for new information provided by the reported impairment, 
rather than merely reacting to “old news.” Therefore, our results show support to Hypothesis 2. 
Panel A of Table 6 tests Hypothesis 3a which posits that goodwill impairment following 
M&A deals selected and managed by a CEO is more positively associated with the probability of 
a forced replacement of the CEO for companies audited by Big 4(5) auditors than for companies 
audited by non-Big 4(5) auditors. We split the full sample into two subsamples: firms audited by 
Big 4 or 5 auditors (BIGAUD = 1) and firms audited by others (BIGAUD = 0), and estimate model 
(1) separately. For brevity, we report the suppressed results. The left-side column shows results 
for the subsample of 4,123 companies audited by Big 4(5) auditors. The coefficient of GWIP is 
positive and significant. The right-side column reports, for the subsample of 1,867 companies 
audited by non-Big 4(5) auditors, that the coefficient of GWIP is not significant. As such, results 
                                                 
9 We exclude BTM from the Table 5 regressions, as the correlation between BTM and EXPGWIP exceeds 0.5. However, 
including BTM in the model does not change the conclusions. 
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in Panel A of Table 6 support Hypothesis 3a that assurance reports provided by Big 4(5) auditors 
are perceived to be higher quality and that the goodwill impairment charge is more likely to be 
relied on by the board. 
We examine Hypothesis 3b in Panel B of Table 7, where we split the sample into firms 
with analyst following above the sample median and firms with analyst following below the 
sample median. We estimate model (2) for two subsamples separately. The left-side column 
reports results for the subsample of 2,874 companies with more analysts, and the right-side 
represents results for the subsample of 3,116 companies with fewer analysts followed. The 
coefficients of GWIP are positive and significant in both subsamples. Untabulated tests show that 
the coefficients are not significantly different. Therefore, we do not find support for Hypothesis 
3b; that is, boards’ decisions based on reported goodwill impairment charges are not affected by 
the number of analyst followings. 
Post-turnover Goodwill Impairment 
One challenge to interpreting the main results as supporting Hypothesis 1 is that we are 
unable to be certain that goodwill impairment charges are related to the acquisitions upon which 
we build our sample versus acquisitions completed by a prior CEO. Other authors report that new 
CEOs tend to take abnormally large asset impairment charges (Francis et al., 1996; Riedl, 2004). 
New CEOs are not responsible for the outcomes of decisions made by their predecessors, and 
therefore impairments reported in their first year are unlikely to affect their reputation with the 
board. Also, recognizing more impairment in the first year reduces the likelihood of needing to 
report impairment charges in subsequent years. To gain further insight into the possibility that the 
goodwill impairment charges primarily follow CEO changes, rather than contribute to forced 
CEOs changes, we focus on CEO turnover subsamples and examine goodwill impairment charges 
around the CEO turnover events in our sample. 
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Specifically, we compare the goodwill impairment charges recognized two years before 
CEO turnovers and two years after CEO turnovers (including the year when the CEO turnover 
occurs and one year after the CEO turnover) for the forced turnover group and the voluntary 
turnover group. The pre-CEO turnover impairment is recorded prior to the departure of the CEO, 
and post-CEO turnover impairment is charged after the incoming CEO has been hired. Panel A of 
Table 7 presents the mean goodwill impairment separately for forced and voluntary turnovers. For 
the pre-turnover period, the mean GWIP for firms with forced turnover (0.023) is significantly 
higher (at the 5% level) than that for firms experiencing voluntary turnover (0.013). The mean 
GWIPDUM is also higher for firms with forced turnover (0.273) than that for firms with voluntary 
turnover (0.207). For the post-turnover period, the mean GWIP of the forced turnover sample is 
0.028, which is not significant for that of the voluntary sample (0.021). The mean GWIPDUM for 
the forced turnover sample is also not significantly different from that of the voluntary turnover 
sample. 
Panel B of Table 7 reports logistic regressions comparing pre- and post-turnover goodwill 
impairment for firms with forced and voluntary CEO turnovers. The results are consistent with 
those in Panel A. Specially, Model (1) of Panel B reports that GWIP prior to the CEO turnover is 
significantly positively associated with the probability of forced (as opposed to voluntary) CEO 
change. Model (2) shows that GWIPDUM prior to the CEO turnover is marginally significant (p 
= 0.0629) for the two turnover groups. In models (3) and (4), post-turnover GWIP and GWIPDUM, 
respectively, are not significantly associated with the probability of forced turnover. Overall, the 
results in Table 7 show that pre-turnover goodwill impairment is associated with the subsequent 
turnover being forced rather than voluntary, whereas post-turnover impairment has no significant 
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association with the CEO change being forced or voluntary.10 The evidence helps alleviate the 
concern that goodwill impairments in our main tests could be driven by acquisitions for which the 
CEOs subsequently removed were not responsible. 
We conduct further robustness checks to ensure our results are not driven by measurement, 
sample selection, or other statistical issues. 
Omitting Firm Fixed Effects 
We include firm fixed effect in the main models to control for unobservable and time-
invariant firm characteristics. Greene (2004) suggests that the estimators of nonlinear fixed-effects 
model can be biased. Therefore, as a robustness check, we re-run the Table 4 regressions without 
firm fixed effects. The results (not tabulated) include a coefficient of GWIP in model (1) of 2.786 
and a coefficient of GWIPDUM in model (2) of 0.448, both significant at the 1% level, 
qualitatively similar to results presented in Table 4. As another way of addressing possible biases 
in nonlinear fixed-effects models, we also estimate the fixed-effect linear probability models. The 
results again remain qualitatively unchanged, with the coefficient of GWIP equal to 0.247 and that 
of GWIPDUM equal to 0.044, both significant at 1%. 
Sample with Doubled Goodwill 
Although we are able to track the acquisitions made by the current CEO, the goodwill on 
the books might have been generated by the previous CEO, which reduces the responsibility of the 
current CEO for M&A performance. We restrict our sample to firms that have doubled their 
goodwill after the acquisitions made by the current CEOs. Our sample size is reduced by half to 
2,623. Table 8 (model 1) presents the results. The coefficient of GWIP is still positive and 
significant at the 1% level. 
                                                 
10 Untabulated results show that relative to the non-turnover sample, the voluntary turnover sample recognizes more 
goodwill impairment only in the post-turnover period, and there is no difference in pre-turnover impairment between 
the two groups. 
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Sample with Nonzero Goodwill Impairment 
As an additional test of whether the magnitude of goodwill impairment is associated with 
forced CEO turnover, we exclude the observations with zero goodwill impairment. In model (2) 
of Table 8, the coefficient of GWIP is still positive and significant, albeit at the 10% level after 
losing 80 percent of the sample. The result supports the inference from Table 4 that the probability 
of forced turnover is increasing in the magnitude of goodwill impairment. 
Management Incentives 
As previously discussed, management may have incentives to avoid or delay the disclosure 
of goodwill impairment. We test whether performance-related incentives affect the association 
between disclosed goodwill impairment and the CEO retention decision. Following Riedl (2004) 
and Glaum, Landsman and Wyrwa(2018), we use two proxies to capture the incentives of 
managers to conceal impairment losses in periods with unusually high or low income before 
recognition of goodwill impairment. We classify a firm as having an unusually high income if its 
income is positive and the change in its income in the current year is above the median among 
those firms with a positive change in income. We classify a firm-year as a big-bath year if its 
income is negative and if it experiences a negative change in income in the current year, which is 
below the median among those firms with a negative change in income. We interact these two 
variables with goodwill impairment, respectively. We find no significant association between the 
goodwill impairment and the forced CEO turnover varies based on these two incentive variables. 
Therefore, we find no evidence that observable management incentives affect the informativeness 
of the goodwill impairment charge to boards’ decisions on the CEO retention. 
Deal Characteristics 
Prior literature has identified a number of deal characteristics, such as overpayment, the 
target’s public or private status and means of payment, that are associated with post-merger 
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performance and likelihood of future goodwill impairment (e.g. Bradley and Sundaram, 2004; 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Loughran and Vijh, 1997; Gu and Lev, 2011). We test whether these 
factors drive the association between the CEO turnover and goodwill impairment. In our model 
(1), we control for a) overpayment, measured as ratio of offering price to target book value; b) 
whether the deal is paid all in cash; c) whether the target is a public company. Our results show 
that none of the above factors are either associated with CEO turnover or mitigate the association 
between goodwill impairment and CEO turnover 11 . The coefficients of impairment remain 
significant at 0.01 level in all models. Above results confirm our assertion that deal characteristics 
cannot explain a deal’s value creation effect due to the fact that information about synergies and 
the success of the integration process only gradually becomes available and realized through 
goodwill impairment. 
7. Conclusion 
We investigate the role of accounting charges for goodwill impairment in informing the 
board’s evaluation of CEO performance in selecting and integrating mergers and acquisitions, 
culminating in the potential dismissal of a poorly performing CEO. We start with merger and 
acquisition deals in years 1997 through 2016 and examine a sample of companies reporting 
goodwill impairment in years 2002 through 2016. We find that the probability of forced CEO 
turnover is increasing in goodwill impairment charges. We also find that when we include both 
goodwill impairment and the stock-price reaction to the announcement of the M&A deal as 
explanatory variables, only goodwill impairment predicts forced CEO turnover. While higher 
goodwill impairment charges appear around all CEO turnovers, the pre-turnover impairment 
charge is significantly higher for forced versus voluntary CEO changes, and the post-turnover 
                                                 
11 Interactions of goodwill impairment and proxies for deal characteristics are insignificant. 
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impairment is similar or even higher for firms experiencing voluntary CEO changes. The results 
support the hypothesized informational role of goodwill impairment for boards’ evaluation of CEO 
M&A performance. 
We also find that the association between goodwill impairment and the forced CEO 
turnover is significant only for its unexpected component, suggesting the impairment surprise 
provides the board with new information about CEO performance. We find the impact of goodwill 
impairment and the forced CEO turnover to be significant for firms audited by Big 4 (5) auditors 
(roughly two thirds of the sample). The result is consistent with high-reputation auditors providing 
better quality assurance on the timing and amount of goodwill impairment, with commensurately 
greater board usage of the impairment information. 
We find the main results to be robust to various measurement, specification and statistical 
issues. Our paper contributes to the literature on the internal governance of corporate merger and 
acquisition decisions as well as the literature on accounting for impaired goodwill. The results 
indicate that impairment charges convey incremental information to the board concerning the 
quality of the CEO’s selection and execution of the business combination and that this information 
affects CEO retention decisions. Further, our paper presents results that should be of interest to 
regulators given that the FASB is currently revisiting accounting for goodwill impairments with 
the goal of improving decision usefulness of the information and rebalancing the cost benefit 
factors associated with recognizing goodwill impairments (FASB, 2019a). We find that accounting 
charges for goodwill impairment, which imply a deterioration in the capabilities of acquired assets 
to generate expected cash flows, provide meaningful signals to corporate boards concerning CEO 
under-performance in selecting and conducting acquisitions. 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
Dependent variable 
FORCED = 1 if the CEO is forced to step down in year t, 0 if the CEO retains or departs voluntarily. . 
Explanatory and control variables 
BHAR = The market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal return (firm buy-and-hold return minus 
CRSP value-weighted index buy-and-hold return) in year t-1. 
BIGAUD = 1 if the company’s auditor in year t-1 is one of the Big 4 (or 5) auditors. 
BTM = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
CAR = The average of three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on acquisition 
announcement days when the CEO is in the current position. The abnormal return on a 
given day is the difference between the return of the firm’s stock and the return of the 
CRSP value-weighted market index. 
CHAIR = 1 if the CEO chairs the board of directors, 0 otherwise. 
EXPGWIP = Expected goodwill impairment, measured as the sum of (1) book value of equity plus 
the goodwill impairment less market value of equity at the end of year t-1, divided 
by total pre-impairment assets at the end of year t-1 and (2) book value of equity 
plus the goodwill impairment less market value of equity at the end of year t-2, 
divided by total pre-impairment assets at the end of year t-2.  
FOUNDER = 1 if the CEO is the founder or co-founder of the company, 0 otherwise. 
GW = Goodwill divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
GWIP  The sum of (1) the absolute value of goodwill impairment in year t-1 divided by total 
assets at the end of year t-2 and (2) the absolute value of goodwill impairment in year t-
2 divided by total assets at the end of year t-3. 
GWIP_post = The sum of (1) the absolute value of goodwill impairment in year t+1 divided by total 
assets at the end of year t and (2) the absolute value of goodwill impairment in year t+2 
divided by total assets at the end of year t+1. 
GWIPDUM = 1 if GWIP is positive, 0 if GWIP is zero. 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. 
LNAGE = The natural logarithm of the CEO’s age at the end of year t-1. 
LNANALYST = The natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the company in year t-1. 
LNAT = The natural logarithm of total assets at the end of year t-1. 
LNTENURE = The natural logarithm of the number of years that the CEO has held the position through 
year t-1. 
ROA = Income before goodwill impairment and extraordinary items in year t-1 divided by total 
assets at the end of year t-2. 
SHROWN = The percentage of outstanding common shares held by the CEO at the end of year t-1. 
UNEXPDUM =  1 if EXPGWIP is less or equal to 0; 0 otherwise. 
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TABLE 1 Sample Selection 





U.S. acquirers with at least $100 million market value from 1997 to 2016  14,159  
Deals with value at least 10% of acquirers' market value  4,973  
   
Execucomp and Compustat   
CEO sample from 2002 to 2016  2,867  29,134  
Less: Firm-years with no prior M&A under the current CEO (1,768) (22,709) 
         Firm-years with zero goodwill at the beginning of the prior year (25) (75) 
         Firm-years with missing variables (22) (360) 
Final sample  1,052  5,990  
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TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std Dev 
FORCED 0.079 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.270 
GWIP 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.357 0.053 
GWIPDUM 0.204 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.403 
LNAT 7.705 7.567 4.822 11.538 1.454 
GW 0.200 0.177 0.000 0.615 0.163 
BHAR 0.063 0.010 -1.039 8.715 0.483 
ROA 0.045 0.049 -0.280 0.255 0.075 
LEV 0.537 0.541 0.099 1.123 0.200 
BTM 0.543 0.468 -0.461 2.059 0.377 
LNAGE 4.029 4.043 3.714 4.317 0.123 
LNTENURE 1.998 2.079 0.000 3.497 0.770 
CHAIR 0.560 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.496 
FOUNDER 0.051 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.221 
SHROWN 2.004 0.496 0.001 28.128 4.435 
BIGAUD 0.688 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.463 
LNANALYST 1.943 2.197 0.000 3.932 1.082 





TABLE 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Two-sample difference tests 
  FORCED = 1  FORCED = 0  Difference test 
 (N = 473) (N = 5,517) t-test Wilcoxon 
 Mean  Median Mean  Median p-value Z-score 
GWIP 0.023 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
GWIPDUM 0.279 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
LNAT 7.903 7.807 7.688 7.552 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 
GW 0.236 0.224 0.197 0.173 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
BHAR -0.048 -0.059 0.072 0.018 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
ROA 0.035 0.043 0.046 0.050 0.003 *** 0.001 *** 
LEV 0.545 0.553 0.536 0.540 0.358  0.317  
BTM 0.549 0.483 0.542 0.467 0.687  0.601  
LNAGE 4.069 4.094 4.026 4.025 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
LNTENURE 2.066 2.079 1.992 2.079 0.044 ** 0.074 * 
CHAIR 0.539 1.000 0.562 1.000 0.338  0.378  
FOUNDER 0.049 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.775  0.741  
SHROWN 1.224 0.387 2.070 0.508 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
BIGAUD 0.683 1.000 0.689 1.000 0.790  0.891  
LNANALYST 1.946 2.303 1.943 2.197 0.954   0.412   
This table reports the descriptive statistics and univariate analysis of variables used in model (1). Panel A reports mean, median, 
minimum, maximum and standard deviations of variables. Panel B compares firms experiencing forced CEO turnover and firms with 
no forced CEO turnover. FORCED equals to one when the CEO is forced to step down, and zero if the CEO is retained or departs 
voluntarily. T-test p-values of the mean difference and Wilcoxon nonparametric Z-scores are reported. *, **, and *** represent 
statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels based on two-sided values, respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized 




TABLE 3 Correlations  
  GWIP LNAT GW BHAR ROA LEV BTM LNAGE LNTEN- 
URE CHAIR 
FOUN- 
DER SHROWN BIGAUD 
LNAN-
AYST 
FORCED 0.043 0.040 0.063 -0.067 -0.038 0.012 0.005 0.096 0.026 -0.012 -0.004 -0.051 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.003) (0.358) (0.688) (<0.001) (0.045) (0.338) (0.775) (<0.001) (0.790)  (0.954) 
               
GWIP  -0.137 0.022 -0.013 -0.213 0.063 0.134 -0.034 -0.003 -0.033 0.033 0.023 0.021 -0.098 
  (<0.001) (0.084) (0.306) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.008) (0.834) (0.011) (0.010) (0.077) (0.104) (<0.001) 
               
LNAT   0.042 -0.050 0.099 0.345 -0.055 0.133 -0.066 0.135 -0.094 -0.138 0.042 0.295 
   (0.001) (0.000) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) 
               
GW    -0.034 0.124 -0.075 -0.096 -0.036 -0.028 0.003 -0.031 -0.038 0.040 0.068 
    (0.009) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.006) (0.031) (0.843) (0.017) (0.003) (0.002) (<0.001) 
               
BHAR     0.190 -0.001 -0.261 0.003 -0.006 0.004 -0.002 0.022 -0.016 -0.008 
     (<0.0001) (0.964 (<0.001) (0.802) (0.616) (0.737) (0.867) (0.086) (0.205) (0.520) 
               
ROA      -0.175 -0.217 0.078 0.033 0.042 -0.019 0.027 0.005 0.123 
      (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.012) (0.001) (0.137) (0.040) (0.706) (<0.001) 
               
LEV       -0.235 0.077 -0.048 0.039 -0.074 -0.059 0.093 -0.073 
       (<0.001) (<0.001) 0.000) 0.003) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
               
BTM        -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.033 -0.014 -0.116 
        (0.927) (0.701) (0.753) (0.874) (0.010) (0.292) (<0.001) 
               
LNAGE         0.372 0.209 0.068 0.126 0.049 0.038         (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.000) (0.004) 
               
LNTENUR
E        
  0.266 0.255 0.329 0.003 0.059 
         (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.787) (<0.001) 
               
CHAIR           0.078 0.107 0.027 0.027           (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.034) (0.034) 
               
FOUNDER            0.261 -0.042 0.029            (<0.001) (0.001) (0.025) 
               
SHROWN             -0.018 -0.064             (0.155) (<0.001) 
               
BIGAUD              -0.005 
                   (0.693) 
This table reports Pearson correlations among variables used in model (1). p-values are presented in parentheses. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles of the sample. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -19.280 *** -19.121 *** -20.655 *** -40.935  
 [84.14]  [82.66]  [93.299]  [0.047]  
GWIP 2.825 ***   2.766 *** -1.227  
 [11.575]    [10.952]  [0.569]  
GWIPDUM   0.467 ***     
   [15.744]      
LNAT 0.141 *** 0.126 *** 0.143 *** 0.073  
 [11.971]  [9.729]  [12.176]  [1.519]  
GW 1.228 *** 1.276 *** 1.181 *** -2.004 *** 
 [13.37]  [14.393]  [12.096]  [11.982]  
BHAR -0.774 *** -0.801 *** -0.795 *** -0.009  
 [21.703]  [23.027]  [22.29]  [0.003]  
ROA -2.323 *** -2.364 *** -2.607 *** -3.518 *** 
 [10.151]  [10.454]  [12.643]  [13.206]  
LEV -0.454  -0.502  -0.481  -0.635  
 [2.157]  [2.618]  [2.379]  [2.098]  
BTM -0.182  -0.248  -0.188  -0.019  
 [1.343]  [2.429]  [1.422]  [0.008]  
LNAGE 3.756 *** 3.784 *** 4.117 *** 7.228 *** 
 [58.513]  [59.018]  [67.445]  [85.615]  
LNTENURE 0.121  0.118  0.112  -0.07  
 [2.304]  [2.189]  [1.963]  [0.385]  
CHAIR -0.266 ** -0.252 ** -0.266 ** 0.04  
 [6.151]  [5.517]  [6.08]  [0.062]  
FOUNDER 0.069  0.089  0.057  -0.077  
 [0.076]  [0.127]  [0.051]  [0.054]  
SHROWN -0.093 *** -0.095 *** -0.097 *** -0.072 *** 
 [19.656]  [20.36]  [20.82]  [7.124]  
BIGAUD -0.035  -0.035  -0.039  -0.124  
 [0.104]  [0.108]  [0.128]  [0.615]  
LNANALYST -0.095 * -0.096 ** -0.102 ** -0.174 ** 
 [3.756]  [3.74]  [4.27]  [5.959]  
Year, Industry FE Yes, Yes  Yes, Yes  Yes, Yes  Yes, Yes  
R2 0.039  0.040  0.043  0.037  
N 5,990   5,990   5,783   5,517   
This table reports logistic regression results for the effect of goodwill impairment on CEO turnover. The dependent variable in the 
first two models is one for forced CEO turnovers, zero for voluntary or non-turnovers. The test variable in the first and third models 
is GWIP, a continuous measure of goodwill impairment in the last two years, and in the other models is GWIPDUM, a dummy 
variable equal to one if goodwill impairment is recognized in the last two years, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the 
third model is one for forced CEO turnovers and zero for non-turnovers, and is one for voluntary CEO turnovers and zero for non-
turnovers in the final model. Chi-square statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels based on two-sided values, respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles. See 
Appendix for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 5 Logistic regressions: adding M&A overpayment 
  Forced vs. All Other (1) Forced vs. All Other (2) 
Intercept -18.870 *** -18.742 *** 
 [73.0174]  [71.938]  
GWIP 2.942 ***   
 [10.362]    
GWIPDUM   0.505 *** 
   [16.198]  
CAR -0.469  -0.506  
 [0.406]  [0.472]  
GWIP*CAR 5.260    
 [0.346]    
GWIPDUM*CAR   8.776  
   [0.827]  
LNAT 0.133 *** 0.122 *** 
 [8.618]  [7.280]  
GW 1.153 *** 1.176 *** 
 [10.321]  [10.662]  
BHAR -2.407 *** -0.696 *** 
 [15.140]  [15.919]  
ROA -2.407 *** -2.454 *** 
 [9.716]  [10.024]  
LEV -0.518 * -0.590 * 
 [2.516]  [3.236]  
BTM -0.279 * -0.363 ** 
 [2.450]  [4.028]  
LNAGE 3.683 *** 3.713 *** 
 [49.884]  [50.376]  
LNTENURE 0.157 * 0.155 * 
 [3.321]  [3.256]  
CHAIR -0.211 * -0.197 * 
 [3.422]  [2.979]  
FOUNDER 0.087  0.104  
 [0.115]  [0.165]  
SHROWN -0.101 *** -0.104 *** 
 [19.003]  [19.793]  
BIGAUD -0.005  -0.001  
 [0.002]  [0.001]  
LNANALYST -0.032  -0.033  
 [0.278]  [0.295]  
Year, Industry FE Yes, Yes  Yes, Yes  
R2,N 0.037, 5,475  0.038, 5,475  
This table reports logistic regressions for the effect of goodwill impairment on CEO turnover, conditioning on overpayment proxied 
by announcement CAR. The dependent variable is one for forced CEO turnovers, zero for voluntary or non-turnovers. CAR is the 
average of three-day cumulative abnormal return centered on acquisition announcement days when the CEO is in the current 
position. Chi-square statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** denote two-tail significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles of the sample. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
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TABLE 6 Logistic regressions: Expected and unexpected goodwill impairment 
  Unexpected Expected Unexpected Expected 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept -20.343 *** -10.037  -20.327 *** -10.227  
 [85.045]  [2.545]  [84.719]  [2.658]  
GWIP 2.899 *** 0.921      
 [7.031]  [0.339]      
GWIPDUM     0.465 *** 0.613  
     [13.641]  [2.08]  
LNAT 0.146 *** -0.175  0.133 *** -0.172  
 [12.266]  [0.966]  [10.256]  [1.012]  
GW 1.088 *** 3.683 *** 1.101 *** 3.731 *** 
 [9.473]  [12.582]  [9.651]  [13.596]  
BHAR -0.71 *** -0.786  -0.711 *** -0.749  
 [17.89]  [2.414]  [17.886]  [2.196]  
ROA -2.639 *** -0.656  -2.643 *** -0.506  
 [11.929]  [0.075]  [11.883]  [0.044]  
LEV -0.401  0.303  -0.41  0.209  
 [1.762]  [0.097]  [1.849]  [0.048]  
LNAGE 4.009 *** 2.078  4.041 *** 2.068  
 [59.608]  [1.734]  [60.151]  [1.717]  
LNTENURE 0.172 ** -0.426 * 0.175 ** -0.444 * 
 [4.069]  [2.975]  [4.227]  [3.203]  
CHAIR -0.242 ** -0.648  -0.237 ** -0.649  
 [4.639]  [2.436]  [4.452]  [2.467]  
FOUNDER -0.072  1.328 * -0.061  1.28 * 
 [0.07]  [3.564]  [0.051]  [3.3]  
SHROWN -0.091 *** -0.096  -0.094 *** -0.098  
 [16.772]  [2.7]  [17.429]  [2.673]  
BIGAUD -0.111  0.642  -0.117  0.645  
 [1.001]  [2.293]  [1.102]  [2.289]  
LNANALYST -0.097 * -0.018  -0.094 * -0.036  
 [3.68]  [0.01]  [3.481]  [0.037]  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-square 0.04  0.074  0.041  0.077  
N 5468   522   5468   522   
This table reports the logistic regression results on the effect of goodwill impairment on force CEO turnover for the subsample 
firms with unexpected and expected goodwill impairment. Dependent variable in columns (1) - (4) is one for forced CEO turnovers, 
zero for voluntary or non-turnovers. Column (1) and (3) show the results for a subsample of firms with expected goodwill 
impairment less than zero (or unexpected impairment). Column (2) and (4) show results for a subsample of firms with expected 
goodwill impairment larger than zero. Expected goodwill impairment, measured as the sum of book value of equity plus the 
goodwill impairment less market value of equity, divided by total pre-impairment assets. Chi-square statistics are in brackets. *, 
**, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels based on two-sided values, respectively. All continuous 




Logistic regressions: The effects of auditor and analyst coverage 
Panel A: Subsamples with and without a Big 4 Auditor 
  BIGAUD = 1   BIGAUD = 0 
 (1)   (2)  
GWIP 3.619   0.612  
 [14.553] ***  [0.112]  
      
Controls Yes   Yes  
Year, Industry FE Yes, Yes   Yes, Yes  
R2 0.041   0.057  
N 4,123     1,867   
      
Panel B: Subsamples with high and low analyst coverage 
  LNANALYST = high   LNANALYST = low 
 (1)  (2) 
GWIP 2.523   2.758  
 [3.025] *  [7.046] *** 
      
Controls Yes   Yes  
Year, Industry FE Yes, Yes   Yes, Yes  
R2 0.054   0.048  
N 2,874     3,116   
This table reports the logistic regression results on the effect of goodwill impairment on force CEO turnover for subsamples based 
on auditors and analysts. Dependent variable in all models is one for forced CEO turnovers, zero for voluntary or non-turnovers. 
Panel A of this table presents results for subsample firms audited by Big 4 (5) (BIGAUD=1) versus non-Big4(5) (BIGAUD = 0) 
auditors in columns (1) and (2), respectively. Panel B of this table reports the logistic regression results for subsample firms with 
high versus low analyst coverage in columns (1) and (2), respectively. LNANALYST is high if the number of analyst followings is 
larger than the sample median, and is low otherwise. Coefficients of control variables are not tabulated in tables for brevity. Chi-
square statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels based on two-sided 






Goodwill impairment pre– and post–CEO turnover 
Panel A: Means and difference of mean tests 
 Forced Voluntary Difference t for difference 
Pre-turnover GWIP 0.023 0.013 0.010 2.29 ** 
Post-turnover GWIP 0.028 0.021 0.001 1.30  
 
     
Pre-turnover GWIPDUM 0.273 0.207 0.066 1.75 * 
Post-turnover GWIPDUM 0.336 0.296 0.040 0.95   
 
Panel B: Logistic regressions to explain forced CEO turnover 







 Pre-turnover Pre-turnover Post-turnover Post-turnover 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GWIP 4.187 **   
    
 [4.28]  
 
 
    
GWIPDUM   0.362 
     
   [2.343]  
    
GWIP_post     1.950    
     [0.962]    
GWIPDUM_post       0.168  
       [0.494]  
         
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Yes  
Year, Industry FE Yes, Yes Yes, Yes Yes, Yes Yes, Yes 
R2 0.175  0.140  0.172 
 0.173  
N 665   665   616   616   
This table compares goodwill impairment around CEO turnover for firms with forced turnovers versus voluntary turnovers. Panel 
A reports means of goodwill impairment in the pre- and post- turnover years and their differences separately for firms with forced 
versus voluntary CEO turnovers. Panel B presents logistic regression results comparing forced versus voluntary CEO turnovers. 
Dependent variable is one for forced CEO turnovers and zero for voluntary turnovers in columns (1)-(4). Test variable in columns 
(1) and (2) is goodwill impairment charged two years before the CEO turnover. Test variable in columns (3) and (4) is goodwill 
impairment charged two years after the CEO turnover. Coefficients of control variables are not tabulated in tables for brevity. Chi-
square statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels based on two-sided 





Logistic regressions: Samples limited to firms with doubled goodwill or nonzero impairment 
  Doubled Goodwill Nonzero Impairment 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept -17.977 *** -25.301  
 [36.401]  [0.02]  
GWIP 3.251 *** 1.963 * 
 [7.2]  [3.12]  
LNAT 0.147 ** 0.090  
 [6.149]  [1.19]  
GW 1.288 ** 1.127  
 [5.68]  [2.477]  
BHAR -0.981 *** -0.639 ** 
 [16.913]  [4.92]  
ROA -1.773 * -1.317  
 [3.131]  [0.906]  
LEV -0.619  -0.622  
 [1.863]  [1.23]  
BTM -0.281  -0.289  
 [1.322]  [1.347]  
LNAGE 3.334 *** 2.962 *** 
 [21.22]  [9.321]  
LNTENURE 0.073  0.312 * 
 [0.361]  [3.744]  
CHAIR -0.388 ** -0.213  
 [6.087]  [1.035]  
FOUNDER 0.086  0.049  
 [0.061]  [0.012]  
SHROWN -0.099 *** -0.094 *** 
 [10.218]  [7.092]  
BIGAUD -0.143  0.399 * 
 [0.814]  [3.025]  
LNANALYST -0.094  0.021  
 [1.492]  [0.043]  
Year, Industry FE Yes, Yes  Yes, Yes  
R2 0.043  0.067  
N 2,623   1,222   
Dependent variable is one for forced CEO turnovers, zero for voluntary or non-turnovers. Column (1) of this table presents results 
for subsample firms that doubled their goodwill after the acquisition. Column (2) of this table presents results for subsample firms 
that recognized non-zero goodwill impairment. Chi-square statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance 
at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels based on two-sided values, respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percentiles of the sample. See Appendix for variable definitions. 
